Lynn Malcom's Federal Appeal
JOHN H. HILL, WSBA #05663
Director, Dept. of Assigned Counsel
Pierce County
949 Market Street, Suite 334
Tacoma, WA 98402-3696
Tel: (253) 798-7292
MICHAEL R. SNEDEKER, Cal.St.Bar No. 62842
Snedeker, Smith & Short
PMB 422
4110 S.E. Hawthorne Blvd.
Portland, Oregon 97214
Tel: (503) 234-3584
Attorneys for Petitioner
MARILYNN R. MALCOM
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
__________________________________________
) NO.
MARILYNN R. MALCOM, )
)
Petitioner )
)
v. ) Clark Cty Sup. Ct. No. 87-1-
) 00339-6; Court of Appeals
ALICE PAYNE, ) Nos. 15119-7, 11735-5-II,
) 22979-0-II; Supreme Court
) No. 67509-1
Superintendent of Washington )
Correctional Center for Women, )
)
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner, MARILYNN R. MALCOM, by and through her attorneys, Michael R. Snedeker[1] and John H. Hill, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, and by verified petition alleges as follows:
I.
JURISDICTION
This case arises under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254.
Petitioner is unlawfully detained by Respondent Alice Payne at the Washington Correctional Center for Women at Gig Harbor in the custody of the Washington Department of Corrections. On September 21, 1987, she was convicted in Clark County Superior Court of twelve counts of statutory rape and indecent liberties. (Clark County Superior Court No. 87-1-00339-6.)[2] She was sentenced to eighteen years in state prison on January 15, 1988.
The Court of Appeals for the State of Washington, Division Two, affirmed the judgment on February 13, 1991. See Court of Appeals for the State of Washington, Division II, State v. Malcom, No. 11735-5-II, attached hereto as Appendix **. On June 10, 1991, Petitioner filed a pro se Personal Restraint Petition before that presented claims essentially the same as those presented in her pro se brief. See PRP No. 15119-7, attached hereto as Appendix *. On September 3, 1991, the Washington Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review. See Order, Supreme Court of Washington, filed 9/3/91, attached hereto as Appendix *. Ruling that most of the claims therein had been presented in her direct appeal, and that she had not shown that other issues raised had resulted in actual and substantial prejudice, the court denied her Personal Restraint Petition on September 24, 1991. The Order Dismissing the Petition is attached hereto as Appendix *. Petitioner’s continuing efforts to vindicate herself resulted in a clemency hearing on September 5, 1997; her petition for clemency was denied.
Petitioner, represented by present counsel, filed another Personal Restraint Petition in the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Two, on February 10, 1998. See *. It was denied on December 4 of that same year, on both substantive and procedural grounds. See Opinion Dismissing Petition, attached hereto as Appendix *. The Washington Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s motion for discretionary review on **. See Denial, attached hereto as Appendix *. Petitioner’s motion to modify that denial was denied on **. See Appendix **.
II.
FACTUAL BASES FOR ALL CLAIMS
A. Background
Petitioner was born in 1946. In 1969, she married Jim Malcom. They had two children: Kirk, born in April of 1974, and Jennifer, born in December of 1977. In 1982, after thirteen years of marriage, she and her husband divorced. The children lived with Petitioner, and spent two nights a week and every other weekend with their father. Between 1982 and 1986 there were numerous disputes between the two parents that began to dampen down after Jim Malcom remarried in 1985. See 9/15/87 RP 44-45; 9/17/87 RP 15-17, 41, 73, 78.
Petitioner’s home in late 1986 was located on the outskirts of Vancouver. Her neighbors included the “Morgan” family, from whom she rented her house, and the “Logan” family. The neighbors’ children – “Chuck Morgan”, six years old; “James Morgan”, four years old; “Neil Morgan”, three years old; and “Brian Logan”, four years old – played with Petitioner’s children and were often around the house. 9/10/87 RP 57-60, 97-100; see the prosecutor’s Motion In Limine, Appendix A. From 1985 to the spring of 1986, Donna Binford and her children, Ryan and Rebecca, lived with Petitioner and Kirk and Jennifer.[3]
In late 1986, Petitioner started the Rainbow Christian Daycare Center and advertised for business in the local paper. The Center, located in her home, opened in November of 1986. Petitioner sought a license, and attended a requisite class. At the same time, she worked on call as a dental assistant, and sold Herbalife products as time permitted. By the end of the year, there were three children in the daycare: “Mark Mason”, six years old; “Michael Richards”, four years old; and “Robert Richards”, two years old. Petitioner also informally cared for the three “Morgan” boys and “Brian Logan” on an occasional basis. And she cared for her own children as well who were then twelve years old (Kirk) and nine years old (Jennifer). Nineteen-year-old Kate Sullivan acted as Petitioner’s childcare assistant.[4] 9/16/87 RP 29-31; 9/17/87 RP 15-17.
B. How The Charges Arose
1. Charges Against Petitioner’s Son Kirk
Sheriff’s office reports[5] indicate that the first allegations of sexual abuse in this case originated with Petitioner’s neighbor, Lori “Logan”, the mother of “Brian”. Ms. “Logan” had been suspicious of Kirk Malcom, and “had heard” that Kirk taught “Chuck Morgan” to masturbate. On January 28, 1987, Ms. “Logan” and her four-year-old son “Brian”, watched a videotape on sexual molestation by strangers entitled “No, go tell.” Afterward, she asked “Brian” if Kirk had ever “done anything to him.” “Brian” supposedly then told her of graphic sexual activity – never before mentioned or complained of – involving Kirk and Jennifer Malcom and the “Morgan” boys. See Appendix F, Clark County Sheriff’s Office [hereafter, “CCSO”] Utility Report, 1/30/87, 10:30 a.m., by Det. Steve Nelson.
Ms. “Logan” immediately told Ms. “Morgan” the details of “Brian”’s supposed allegations. Ms. “Morgan” in turn questioned her oldest son, “Chuck”, who denied that anything of this nature had happened to him. However, according to Ms. “Morgan”, “Chuck” said that the acts “Brian” supposedly described to his mother did happen to his brothers, to “Brian”, to “Michael Richards” and to “Mark Mason”. Ms. “Morgan” also questioned her other two children, “James” and “Neil”. According to her, both told her about acts of a sexual nature involving Kirk. See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report, 1/29/87, by Officer Lyn Farr, re: “Morgan”.
None of these children had ever complained about or even mentioned these alleged acts prior to January 28; they still played with the Malcom children and came in and out of the Malcom home.
On January 29, Ms. “Logan” and Ms. “Morgan” both telephoned the Clark County Sheriff’s Office and reported what their children had allegedly told them. See ibid.; see also Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report, 1/29/87, by Officer Lyn Farr, re: “Logan”.
On January 30, 1987, Ms. “Logan” and “Brian Logan” went to Detective Nelson’s office. According to Nelson’s report, Ms. “Logan” told him that “Brian” said that Kirk inserted a screwdriver into his rectum, “peed” into his rectum, “peed” into a squirt gun, that Kirk and Jennifer took turns licking the penises and anuses of himself and the three sons of next-door neighbor Gail “Morgan”, and that Kirk threatened to squirt him with “pee” if he ever told his parents. However, when Nelson asked “Brian” questions, “Brian” ignored him and refused to answer. The only part of the allegations “Brian” confirmed to Nelson involved the squirt gun. See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report, 1/30/87, 10:30 a.m., by Det. Nelson.
Also on January 30, Nelson interviewed “Chuck Morgan” about the allegations relayed by Ms. “Morgan”. According to Nelson, “Chuck” told him everything he had told his mother. See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report, 1/30/87 [no time noted], by Det. Nelson. Petitioner has never been provided with any report of any interview or discussion between Nelson and Ms. “Morgan”. Kirk Malcom was arrested on January 30, 1987, and charged with several counts of rape.
Shortly after these initial interviews, Sharon Krause joined Nelson in interviewing the alleged child victims, and at least one therapist was used to interview and “counsel” “Mark Mason”, Lori “Logan” and “Brian Logan”. Numerous interviews were conducted, and medical examinations were made of “Brian Logan”, the three “Morgan” boys, and “Mark Mason”. On February 6, 1987, a warrant was obtained and Petitioner’s house was searched. See Appendix F, passim.
2. Petitioner Is Implicated
Despite the apparent investigative momentum reflected in the February reports, no reports have ever been provided to Petitioner reflecting any official activity on the case during the month of March, 1987. The next report that appears is dated April 6, 1987, based on a conversation between Lori “Logan” and Nelson on April 4. This report contains the first reference to Petitioner as an alleged participant in sexual activity with children. Prior to April 6, the only person named by the children as a perpetrator was Kirk Malcom.
The stated source of the April 6 report was Lori “Logan”, who claimed that her son “Brian” spontaneously told her while watching television on April 1, that “Lynn was there when Kirk [sexually abused] us.” See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report, 4/6/87, by Det. Nelson. Despite this explosive accusation, no reports apparently exist of any official activity or investigation of the case for the next seven days.[6]
The next mention of this investigation occurs on Monday, April 13, 1987. Lori “Logan” called Gail “Morgan” to relate that “Brian” had accused Lynn Malcom. Ms. “Morgan” interviewed each of her children separately and they denied any knowledge of Lynn being present. Nelson then reports that the “Morgan”, “Logan” and “Mason” families met at Lori “Logan”’ home the night of April 12; eventually the children were said to have aimed new accusations of violence and sexual abuse at Petitioner. The accusations involved bizarre and incredible tales of large-scale child sexual abuse supposedly perpetrated by Petitioner. These allegations were related by Lori “Logan” and Gail “Morgan” in phone calls to Detective Nelson. See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Reports, 4/6/87, 4/13/87, by Det. Nelson.
Krause then conducted a lengthy interview with Jennifer, who repeatedly denied that her mother abused her. On April 16, a second search was made of Petitioner’s home. In the affidavit in support of this search, Detective Nelson detailed a long list of sexual aids and pictures, computer and bank records, and incriminating documents he believed would be found. Again, nothing incriminating was found. See 4/16/87 affidavit and return, Appendix F.
Despite Jennifer’s denials that her mother had abused her, and despite the failure to unearth any incriminating evidence during the search, Detective Krause elected to promptly remove Jennifer from her home with Petitioner. On April 17, Petitioner agreed to the prosecution’s request that she take a polygraph examination, administered by Jerry Oswley. Questions relevant to three of the allegations made against Petitioner were asked, and it was the opinion of the examiner that her response was “consistent with the usual indications of deception.” See Report of 4/17/87 from Oswley to Sharon Krause, p. 1. Then, in another interview of Jennifer on April 20, Krause elicited from Jennifer accusations against Petitioner similar to those described by the other children. See Appendix F CCSO Utility Reports of 4/16/87 and 4/20/87, by Det. Krause.
Kirk Malcom had been charged with six counts of rape. On April 20, he pleaded guilty to indecent liberties. After Jennifer’s accusation that same day, Krause interviewed Kirk in order to obtain accusations from him against his mother. As he had several times before, Kirk denied that Petitioner was involved in any way in child sexual abuse. See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report, 4/20/87, by Det. Krause.
On April 22, Krause again turned to Kirk. Krause told him that his sister had accused Petitioner. Kirk continued to deny that his mother had abused anyone. Krause then had Kirk meet with his father who told him that it would help his mother, and himself, if Kirk accused her. He then returned to the Krause interview, and this time agreed that Petitioner had also participated in child sexual abuse. 9/15/87 RP 6;[7] see Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report, 4/22/87, by Det. Krause.
Thus, Petitioner – who despite over two months of investigation had never been mentioned by any child as a perpetrator of anything and who had never been arrested for anything in her life – became, in the span of two weeks in April, the target of unspeakable accusations of child sexual abuse and incest.
C. The Rise and Fall of Ritual Abuse Charges
In May of 1987, investigators began producing another round of accusations. Charges simultaneously surfaced from several children that Petitioner and Kirk had committed multiple murders; had engaged in Satanic ritualistic abuse of the children; had blown up people with bombs; had moved dead people to junkyards; had a computer stored in a junkyard under the hood of a car that could produce pictures of murdered children; and much, much more. See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Reports of 5/14/87, by Det. Nelson; 5/14/87 report of therapist Karen Gladyschild, Appendix F; see also Declaration of Dr. Maggie Bruck, attached hereto as Appendix G, p. 5.
The prosecution became concerned about the believability of these accusations, particularly when its investigation revealed none of the physical evidence associated with these charges. On June 2, Krause and Nelson returned to reinterview “Chuck Morgan” again. The report indicated a sharp change in Krause’s interviewing style. For the first time, her report indicates that she explained in detail the importance of telling the truth, and challenged the interviewee; she asked “Chuck” if it really happened or if he might be “mixed up.” These techniques were not, however, used consistently throughout the interview.
During this interview, “Chuck” recanted all claims about instruments used in drawings, children being murdered, other adults being involved, having to drink strange substances, and pornography. He was also able to provide the sources of some of the false reports (i.e., his mother; magazine pictures of dildos; TV programs; common bathroom items). See CCSO Utility Report of 6/3/87, by Detective Krause, passim; Declaration of Dr. Bruck, Appendix G, p. *.
When Gail “Morgan” and Lori “Logan” learned of “Chuck”’s recantations, they became very upset, and accused Krause of having manipulated “Chuck”. They said that they “believed the children,” and threatened to pull their children out of the case. See CCSO Utility Reports of 6/3/87 and 6/4/87.
D. Analysis of Investigation: How the Case Against Petitioner Was Created
Krause and Nelson’s interviews of the child witnesses and alleged child victims were characterized by an absence of verbatim recordings, the destruction of contemporary interview notes, and rampant interviewer bias.
Dr. Maggie Bruck, one of North America’s leading cognitive psychologists and an expert on children’s suggestibility, has carefully examined dozens of reports prepared by Nelson and Krause in this case. She concludes that it is impossible to tell when or if any of the children were actually abused or whether the accusations instead resulted from suggestive and coercive interrogation techniques. This is because the interviewing/interrogation of the children by their parents and by Nelson and Krause was so insistent, suggestive, and coercive as to render any accusations gleaned therefrom unreliable. Appendix G, p. 50.
Dr. Bruck demonstrates that the questioners used the following suggestive techniques:
1. Insisting on confirmatory statements while ignoring disconfirming statements;
2. Repeatedly interviewing children;
3. Sharing information with each child ostensibly gotten from another child;
4. Repeating questions across interviews and within interviews;
5. Creating an atmosphere of accusation against Petitioner, setting an emotional tone which conveyed both implicit and explicit threats and bribes to the children for the desired answers;
6. Telling the children that the authorities already “knew” that something happened and Petitioner was involved;
7. Rewarding children with presents for “telling;”
8. Invoking their high status to encourage accusations against Petitioner;
9. Using stereotype induction, or the describing of Petitioner as a bad person;
10. Using sexual props and cues;
11. Relying on peer pressure; and
12. Using visualization techniques directing the children to “think hard” about being abused by Petitioner. Appendix G, pp. 10-22.
Each of these techniques can induce false accusations. When used in combination, as in the present case, they lead to false charges of sex abuse in very short order. Appendix G, p. 27. Children can come to believe their false statements, and present them so convincingly that no adult can tell the difference. See Appendix G, p. 50.
As Dr. Bruck observes, the interview techniques utilized on the alleged victims in this case went beyond suggestive and were sometimes very coercive. The length of questioning sessions was grossly out of proportion to the age of the children; they lasted up to several hours. Interviews of such length not only are painful to children, but they have been shown to produce more incorrect statements from them. Here, sessions of more than one hour were commonplace. Appendix G, p. 30.
Several interviews of the children were done without any report at all being made. The written reports prepared by Sharon Krause, despite the liberal use of quotation marks and assurances that everything of importance was included, are demonstrably inaccurate and incomplete. For example, Jennifer makes a number of claims that seem to be based on “Chuck”’s and “Mark”’s reports of a few days earlier (e.g., pornography, shots, smothered in plastic bags, insertion of turkey-baster enema). The statements attributed to her seem to match “Chuck”’s almost to the detail (e.g., the little blue thing you squeeze and air comes out). See CCSO Utility Report of 4/20/87, p. 11; compare with 4/16/87 search warrant affidavit, Appendix F.
The problem is that “Chuck” later told Krause that he had made all of this up and that none of it was true. “Chuck” is reported as telling Krause that the blue bulb you squeeze was never inserted into their rectums, but was something “Chuck”’s mother used on his little sister when she had a cold. Appendix F, 6/2/87 Utility Report, p. 14. Dr. Bruck asks, “So, if there was no such instrument used, how did it get into Jennifer’s report? It is impossible that Jennifer made these claims spontaneously, as they are represented in this report. The only sensible answer is that Krause suggested this to her and pursued her until she made these claims.” Appendix G, p. 45.
Thus, the reports provided to counsel made clear that the prosecution not only relentlessly pursued the children until they echoed what the interviewers wanted to hear, but that the interviewers falsely attributed to the children spontaneous statements that could only have been the result of insistent direction. The result was the generation of accusations against Petitioner that were unreliable and false. Appendix G, p. 45; Declaration of Jennifer Malcom, attached hereto as Appendix H, p. 3.
III.
THE CASE AGAINST PETITIONER
A. Exclusion of Testimony About or From Six of Eight Children Allegedly Abused
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of crimes against seven children: Kirk Malcom, Jennifer Malcom, “Chuck” and “James Morgan”, “Mark Mason”, “Brian Logan”, and “Michael Richards”. The jury, however, heard nothing at all about any of the statements made by any child save Kirk and Jennifer.
The prosecutor described how the parents got together, shared information, improperly suggested things to the children, and used unreliable interview techniques. He stated that he had “several very heated conversations about Mrs. “Logan” hindering this investigation.” 9/8/87 RP 183; see Appendix B. According to the prosecutor, wild and false charges of murders and rituals were the product of Lori “Logan”’ improper questioning of “Brian”. She then passed these allegations on to Gail “Morgan” who in turn grilled her own children. Ms. “Morgan” then allowed Ms. “Logan” to question the “Morgan” children, leading them to also make false charges. From there, the lie-telling spread to other children. 9/8/87 RP 183.
The charges of “killing of children and so forth, which the police later determined not to be true; [sic] came from Lori “Logan” interviewing her son “Brian”, who you found to be an incompetent witness . . . Most of the statements came from his mother, who supposedly got them from him. . . .” 9/8/87 RP 118-119; see also RP 120 (prosecutor concedes that the charges were “crazy, bizarre allegations of killing and dead animals and dead children and so forth, about which there was no physical corroboration” and which were “debunked” by police).
The prosecutor told the court that early on in the investigation, he participated in a meeting between local law enforcement officials and the parents of the alleged victims. The purpose of the meeting was to “basically attempt to prevent the parents of the kids that you’ve seen today . . . from questioning their children any further.” 9/8/87 RP 182-183.
“We advised them that if their children told them things, that’s fine; but they should listen but not question. And we specifically talked about the dangers of leading questions and the dangers of sharing information with one another. The “Logan” and the “Morgan”s live in the same neighborhood and interact regularly just by proximity. Their kids play with each other.
“And we warned them about the dangers of sharing information that their children may have revealed. They did not heed our warnings. As a result, a lot of this stuff that we’ve been talking about today was elicited, not just from one child, but then it came from another, and looked on the surface like there might be some – it might be real, there might be something to it, because it was coming from more than one source.
“As we developed, or delved into it deeper, it became clear that it was shared information, improperly suggested to the kids, improperly elicited, not using reliable techniques and so forth.” 9/8/87 RP 183, emphasis added.
What neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel told the court, however, is that the investigating officers who developed the very charges of which Petitioner was convicted used precisely the same techniques to get them that were later roundly condemned as having created false allegations.
B. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Investigate/Present a Defense Based on the Suspicious Circumstances Under Which the Charges Arose and the Suggestive and Coercive Interview Techniques Utilized to Extract Accusations from the Alleged Victims
There has never been any dispute that it was Ms. “Logan” who started this entire investigation – and it was she who expanded it in April to include Petitioner. But counsel for Petitioner did nothing to enlighten the jury about this crucial fact. He occasionally told the court that the children seemed to have been manipulated, but he never made a coherent offer of proof.
Early on, counsel had an extremely difficult time articulating why it was important to have an expert look at the pattern of disclosures by the children to see if they were reliable. Finally the trial court said, “I’m still trying to see if there’s a reason to give you an expert and I don’t yet see it, I guess. Perhaps we best wait until you develop your own theory of why you need one.” Counsel agreed. 8/31/87 RP 28-30. The court ultimately awarded counsel money for the hiring of an expert on the manipulation of children (9/4/87 RP 40), but to no avail. Counsel did not follow through and obtain one, nor did he explain what difficulties he may have had that prevented him from doing so.
Counsel did indicate early in the trial that he wanted to call the youngest children. However, for reasons never explained, he sought to call only “Chuck Morgan” and “Mark Mason”, and then only for the limited purpose of showing that they had named adults who were not prosecuted. 9/8/87 RP 131-132. Counsel continually vacillated on whether or not he wanted the youngest children to be found competent or incompetent. He ultimately asked that the trial court find them incompetent. This request is incomprehensible since their testimony was either exculpatory (both five-year-old “Michael Richards” and seven-year-old “Mark Mason” testified that all they ever did at Petitioner’s house was “play” [9/8/87 RP 153; 161]), or the product of extremely leading questions (see, e.g., testimony of “James Morgan” [9/8/87 RP 94-98]).
Counsel asked no questions of Lori “Logan” or Gail “Morgan” about their strenuous leading of the children, their belief that this was a so-called Satanic Ritual Abuse Case, their rewarding their children for “telling” by buying them toys, or their persistent belief that there were dead children that had been hidden somewhere by Petitioner and many others. Instead, counsel argued that he should be able to present to the jury their opinions that the police manipulated their children (they felt that Krause and others badgered their children into false recantations of murder and ritual abuse charges). The trial court properly ruled that these were inadmissible opinions since the parents were not present during the interviews. 9/8/87 RP 140.
Counsel finally told the court that he did not want to ask either the parents or the children what the children said outside of court. He said that he did not see how it was relevant that “Chuck”, after being questioned over and over by Lori “Logan” who had just bought a book on “Satanic Abuse,” indicated during an interview that Petitioner killed children and buried them in a junkyard. 9/17/87 RP 103.
Counsel never sought to glean from either Detective Krause or Nelson what interview techniques they used, or why they used them. He never sought to confront either Nelson or Krause about the improper investigative techniques that are readily apparent from the investigative reports given to him. Counsel failed to object to the State’s denial of discovery regarding missing reports of interviews between Officer Nelson and Ms. “Morgan”.
Counsel failed to grasp even the most basic potential defense strategies for the case. This is vividly demonstrated by his ignorance of the circumstances surrounding the investigatory phase. Counsel told the court he did not want to call any children to say that they had never mentioned Petitioner during any of the numerous February interviews, because there was “no evidence presented in this case that they did mention her originally.” 9/17/87 RP 181.
The trial court, however, understood the relevance. It informed counsel – to no avail – that it would indeed be relevant and admissible evidence to call witnesses who would testify that Petitioner was not mentioned either around the time of the supposed molestations, or later during the first wave of parental and police interviews. 9/17/87 RP 180-181. Still, counsel failed to act. Counsel did not even expend the monies allotted by the trial court to consult with an expert on the issue of directive interview techniques.
C. Testimony of Kirk and Jennifer Malcom; Jennifer’s Recantation
The child witnesses directly presented by the prosecution were Kirk and Jennifer Malcom. Their testimony deviated in material respects. Jennifer, for example, said that nothing had happened outdoors at the “fort” made by Kirk and Ryan Binford, while Kirk testified that much of the alleged abuse he described took place there; he told the jury that Petitioner directed elaborate sexual activity involving six or seven children and herself while out of doors, near an area that was occasionally visited by neighbors. 9\14\87 RP 160, 167; 9\15\87 RP 112.
Jennifer’s testimony consists almost entirely of one- and two-word answers to detailed questions by the prosecutor, whose voice tells the story. See 9\15\87 RP 95-122 and Appendix G, esp. pages 42-46.
She has recanted entirely her accusations against her mother made at trial, and now tells how she was badgered and duped into making them. See recantation of Jennifer Malcom, attached hereto as Appendix L. She states that she did not understand the word “sexual” and was confused about its meaning, saying: “I started to think that when my mom hugged me or touched me in the bathtub, that was wrong . . . and it was just the way Sharon Krause was questioning me that made me start thinking that any kind of touch was a “bad touch.” Appendix H, p. 2. Jennifer describes the questioning done by Sharon Krause, saying: “I remember her . . . keeping me for what seemed like forever. She kept asking me and asking me if my mom did this to me or that to me, talking about things that I had a hard time understanding.” Appendix H, p. 3.
Relentless and intimidating interrogation tactics can be recognized in Jennifer’s description of Krause’s approach: “When I kept telling her “no” she got mad at me. She would almost beg me to answer her in the right way; it took a while to see what she wanted me to say . . . which meant agreeing to all of the accusations she was making against my mom.” Appendix H, p.3.
According to Jennifer, Krause resorted to threats and bribes to extract disclosures of sex abuse: “She even told me that if I wanted to see mom again, I needed to help Sharon help my mom by going along with her questions. After many hours and many interviews, I decided to tell her what she wanted to hear simply to get her off my back, so that I could get home to my mom.” Appendix H, p. 4.
Jennifer’s recantation is buttressed by the coercive and suggestive nature of her interviews. See Appendix G, p. 45. Her first “accusations” contain material gleaned from “Chuck Morgan” that was later recanted. Ibid. A close look at the official records of her interrogations by Sharon Krause, as well as Krause’s other interviews, shows how determined she was to obtain confirmation from Jennifer of their scenario.
The other witness against Petitioner was her son Kirk. He had been removed from Petitioner’s custody when the charges first arose in late January, 1987, and lived with his father thereafter. See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report of 1/30/87, p. 4. Kirk acknowledged at trial that for months he had never mentioned his mother’s alleged involvement in sexual activity with the children or himself. 9/15/87 RP 5-6, 17. He did, however, as noted earlier, have numerous counts of rape hanging over his head. At the time he accused his mother, he had not yet been sentenced. After persistent efforts, Krause finally succeeded in obtaining accusations from Kirk against Petitioner on April 22, 1987. See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report, 4/22/87, by Det. Krause; see also 9/15/87 RP 5-6; see Appendix G, at pages 46-49. Ultimately, he received six months in juvenile hall as punishment.
The prosecutor made much of the fact that Kirk described actual details of the sex act. See 9\21\87 RT 65, 68. This should not have been surprising, however, because he also testified that he had been taught sex education in the 7th grade;[8] that he had been shown a very explicit pornographic film by Ron Cole, a teen-ager who had molested him earlier (9/14/87 RP 217-218), and had found and read Playboy magazines in his father’s house, and showed them to Ryan Binford. 9/14/87 RP 15.
Dr. Bruck closely analyzes the official pressures on Kirk and his shifting statements as to what supposedly occurred, saying: “It is possible that Kirk’s allegations were . . . false and were the result of the coercive interviewing procedures but also reflected a motivation to lie. Possibly Kirk thought (or was told) that by helping the police, his sentence could be reduced or his status in the current facility could be changed. Certainly, some of his allegations are suspect due to a lack of evidence . . . and these very allegations were recanted a month previously by “Chuck Morgan” . . . There is no doubt that he is an unreliable witness.” Appendix G, p. 49.
D. Unchallenged and False Medical Evidence
The prosecution relied heavily on medical evidence of an examination of Jennifer done by Dr. Brigitte Mengelberg which the jury was told established that she had been repeatedly sexually abused.[9] However, it is now clear that Dr. Mengelberg’s testimony was grossly misleading and that she was unqualified to render any opinion in this case.
Dr. Steven Gabaeff is a Board-certified diplomat in emergency medicine and an experienced physician who has examined thousands of children. For years, he has been the consultant to the San Diego County District Attorney and was their architect of protocols for the proper physical examination of children suspected to have been sexually abused. Dr. Gabaeff has reviewed all the medical reports prepared in this case; the color photographs placed into evidence (attached hereto as Appendix J1 and J2); and Dr. Mengelberg’s trial testimony. He concludes that there is nothing whatsoever in these materials showing any evidence of sex abuse, and explains why. See Declaration of Dr. Steven Gabaeff, attached hereto as Appendix K.
Dr. Mengelberg testified that Jennifer had lax sphincter tone that was probably the result of chronic rectal penetration. For reasons that remain unclear, Dr. Mengelberg had placed Jennifer under a general anesthetic to perform a genital examination, yet never attempted to follow up to see if the results were duplicated when Jennifer was not totally sedated. As it turns out, the evidence upon which she relied for her conclusions about chronic rectal penetration was the predictable and expected effect of general anesthesia. Dr. Gabaeff states: “It is an egregious act of bias and incompetence to draw diagnostic conclusions regarding the laxity, shape and muscle tone of body orifices from observations made while am patient is under a general anesthetic.” Appendix K, p. 9.
Dr. Gabaeff shows that Dr. Mengelberg’s methods of examination guarantee that her conclusions mean absolutely nothing. “In fact, I would go so far as to say that the reliability of any such conclusions is practically zero. The failure to corroborate any findings noted in the operating room with an examination of the child while she is awake is negligent and inexcusable.” Appendix K, p. 8.
Furthermore, the photographs (Appendixes J1, J2) clearly demonstrate that even under general anaesthetic Jennifer’s anal opening is normal, and that Dr. Mengelberg’s testimony that Jennifer’s hymen was “completely dilated and gone” (9\14\87 RP 74-75) is flatly refuted by the photograph showing the presence in Jennifer of a normal hymen of normal size. Gabaeff remarks: “[P]hotograph O1 . . . of the genitalia of the child clearly demonstrates the presence of a normal hymen of normal size for a nine-year old child.” Appendix K, p. 10. “Dr. Mengelberg somehow overlooked a hymen that is clearly visible on her photograph.”
He also disputes Mengelberg’s testimony regarding the texture and color of the vaginal tissues, and the remnants of small lacerations. “This is consistent with superficial trauma secondary to a fall that had taken place quite recently, and not consistent with sexual abuse months earlier.” Appendix K, p. 12.
Dr. Gabaeff also demonstrates that Dr. Mengelberg’s testimony in this case was inexcusably biased, and her opinions entirely unsupported, and largely refuted, by the available evidence. He finds it especially disturbing that Mengelberg’s narrative “fails to apply standard conventions in medical terminology that mandate the use of ‘alleged’ in describing acts reported by the patient and family . . . apparently [reflecting] an inappropriate underlying belief that the “history” of abuse was true. For example, it flatly stated that Jennifer had been abused for six years.” Appendix K, p. 13-14.
A clear example of the extent to which Mengelberg was misinformed is illustrated by the fact that her report states that “all previous children have sustained anal penetrations.” See Appendix I. Had Krause actually provided Dr. Mengelberg with the medical reports of the examinations of the four boys, Dr. Mengelberg could not have made this statement. see Appendix K, p. 14; medical reports, attached hereto as Appendix L. In fact, Detective Krause deliberately supplied Dr. Mengelberg with false information; she knew or should have known that the reports either reflected no traces of anything suggesting sexual abuse, or reflected markings that were then ambiguous but are now known to be present in substantial numbers of non-abused children.
The medical reports of the boys allegedly abused were actually exonerating evidence. In light of statements attributed to them by their mothers that they had had screwdrivers repeatedly inserted into their rectums, the boys were medically examined in early February of 1987, before Jennifer’s examination. Two of the boys show no physical signs of any type. Small markings were reported in two others that were ambiguous at the time, but are now known to be common in all children, abused or not. Appendix K. No evidence was found on any of these boys indicating that they had been sexually abused.
In addition, CCSO reports make clear that “Michael Richards” was also examined for physical traces of sex abuse, and that no traces were found. See Appendix F, CCSO Utility Report, 2/18/87, by Det. Nelson.
None of this exculpatory medical evidence was placed before the jury by counsel for Petitioner. Therefore, counsel not only failed to present evidence to the jury which showed that it was highly unlikely that screwdriver penetrations really happened, but counsel made no challenge at all either to the inflammatory and erroneous testimony of Dr. Mengelberg or to her inadequate qualifications to render it. Finally, counsel did nothing to attack the complicity of Sharon Krause in developing this false and misleading medical report by supplying Dr. Mengelberg with misleading information regarding both Jennifer and other children who had been medically examined. In sum, counsel did nothing whatsoever to impeach this vulnerable but devastating “scientific” testimony. To the extent that any of Dr. Mengelberg’s testimony was inculpatory at the time she appeared, normative studies done since Petitioner’s trial clearly show that the physical races she labeled as evidence of sex abuse are present in many, or even most, all children of Jennifer’s age. Petitioner was actually and substantially prejudiced by this supposedly objective corroboration of her trial testimony.
E. Trauma Evidence
Despite his earlier harsh assessments of them as manipulators, the prosecution called Lori “Logan”, Gail “Morgan”, M’yliss “Richards”, and Terri and David “Mason” to testify regarding behavior by their children. After their testimony Dr. Kevin McGovern was called as a witness. His qualifications as an expert in the area of diagnosing and treating child sexual abuse was established at length, and not questioned by counsel for Petitioner. 9\14\87 RP 12-18. He presented to he jury the current state of knowledge on these topics, and told them that in the previous eight years there had been “much research, quantifiable research” on child sex abuse and its related symptoms. 9\14\87 RP 20. as a result of this research, there were characteristic of children’s behavior related to child sex abuse that have gained general acceptance in his profession, and were relied on for diagnosis and treatment. 9\14\87 RP 23. After a lengthy hypothetical question premised on the parents’ testimony of their children’s behavior, Dr. McGovern testified that these behaviors were caused by some form of trauma, and that “you normally see these types of symptoms in children where there’s been some type of abuse. Symptoms we’ve talked about here, i.e., hostility, clinging, insecurity, bedwetting, soiling pants, hanging on to parent’s leg, desire not to go a certain location, normally are related to abuse.” 9/14/87 RP 39.
Counsel did not ask Dr. McGovern to describe the “research” on which his views were founded. Had he done so, he would have learned that such research did not exist, nor was there – or is there – any consensus of the type described by Dr. McGovern. Surveys done before and after Petitioner’s trial show that there is no consensus at all as to what behaviors are related to sex abuse, and that there is no research, quantifiable or otherwise, showing that the above-described symptoms are related to abuse.
IV.
PETITIONER’S DEFENSE
[10][11][12][13] Petitioner’s defense was brief, lasting less than one day. She elicited testimony from her ex-husband, from members of the Binford family who had lived with her, and from Kate Sullivan, the young woman she had hired to assist her day care center, that they had never seen any behavior that would suggest she was a pedophile, or any traces of bizarre conduct. See testimony of Katherine Sullivan, Donna and Ryan Binford, Rebecca Heinze and Phillip Bellner, 9/16-9/17/87 RP, passim.
Petitioner also appeared on her own behalf, and strongly denied that any of the charged events had taken place. 9/17/87 RP 15 et seq. She placed before the jury evidence that her life was an open one, and that the events described, such as sexual orgies out of doors involving herself and eight children, were highly implausible.
What she did not do, however, was counter in any way the state’s “experts.” Sharon Krause was presented as an expert in investigation. 9\16\87 RP 43-44. Dr. Mengelberg was presented as a medical expert on the physical traces left by sex abuse. 9\14\87 RP 67. Dr. McGovern was presented as an expert on child sex abuse victims, and their symptoms and treatment. 9\14\87 12. Not only did counsel not counter these very vulnerable witnesses with experts of his own, but he did not do even the most rudimentary cross-examination.
He asked no questions of Krause or Nelson about their investigative techniques either in general or as applied in any interview. He did not notice material contradictions in Krause’s trial testimony, let alone the police reports. He did not notice Dr. Mengelberg’s lack of qualifications or the manifest bias and mistaken beliefs about the earlier examinations contained in her report. There is no record of his having consulted his own doctor, or having asked the court for funds to retain one to at least examine Dr. Mengelberg’s report and photographs. Finally, he failed to make Dr. McGovern specify what was the research on which he relied.
Without experts to counter these witnesses, and without even questions that might arouse skepticism, the case was not just a credibility battle between Petitioner and her children. It was Petitioner against the professions as well. For a jury that was not aware of the bizarre way this investigation had started or how bizarre it became, the choice of whom to believe was easy.
A. Sentencing
After Petitioner was convicted, she was referred to Dr. Steven Jensen for a psychological/psychosexual evaluation. Dr. Jensen conducted a thorough examination. He interviewed Petitioner and administered a battery of nine tests to her. He also referred to a second polygraph that was performed that was performed by Roy Jaul as part of his center’s evaluation process, not in reference to any specific acts Petitioner was accused of, but rather related to her history of sexuality in general, i.e., her first sexual related contact, sibling sexual exploration, age of virginity loss, etc. See Psychological/Psychosexual Evaluation of Marilynn Malcom by Dr. Steve Jensen, 12/7/87, attached hereto as Appendix R.
Dr. Jensen concluded that there was a notable lack of data derived from conventional assessment techniques to support a diagnosis of sexual deviancy. He expected more symptoms of delusional thinking, somatization, and antisocial attitudes, but “neither objective nor projective personality tests revealed anything in this regard.” A mental status examination likewise revealed nothing significant. “Were evidence of her misconduct merely compelling, this woman might appear to be innocent. Her act is that good. Unfortunately for her, the evidence is so overwhelming that any temptation to be swayed is short-lived.” Appendix R, p. 8.
The “overwhelming” evidence, however, consisted of the medical reports described above, as well as police reports and therapist Karen Gladyschild’s reports containing material that the prosecutor himself had characterized on the record as false. See, e.g., Jensen’s summary of the “facts” of this case, which include allegations that Petitioner urinated and defecated on the children, and they on her, and she gave them intramuscular injections which caused numbness, p. 2. For reasons never explained in court, the prosecutor had supplied the therapist with allegations that he had earlier represented in open court to be untrue. It was solely on the basis of this false material that the psychologist labeled Petitioner as a pedophile; this report was an intrinsic part of the material considered by the trial court in imposing Petitioner’s sentence.
Counsel, however, did nothing to object to or challenge any aspect of the sentencing report. The report, as noted by this Court, was never made a part of the record on appeal.
Since her incarceration, Petitioner has been an excellent inmate, and gained many adherents within the correctional system and in the outside community during her time in prison. Psychiatric examinations done within prison show no signs of pathology. See documents from prison, attached hereto as Appendix T.
This petition is timely. Petitioner has done everything within her power to obtain vindication of her innocence since being incarcerated. She has been hampered in her efforts by the loss of all police reports by her trial counsel and her inability to obtain a copy of all the clerk’s papers in her case. (See declaration of Marilynn Malcom, Appendix S. She was able to obtain assistance from investigator Leigh Hearon, who eventually obtained a set of redacted police reports from the prosecutor’s office; that set is attached to this petition. She has written to the governor’s office and to all her legislators in an effort to obtain support. Keenly aware of her lack of knowledge and resources, she has also tried in every way she knew how to obtain counsel. In early 1996, her daughter wrote to her, and recanted her testimony. She obtained a clemency hearing later that year, and in April of 1997, she was successful in obtaining counsel; present counsel agreed to represent her.
In the course of investigating this complex case, a substantial number of material facts were discovered that buttressed Jennifer’s recantation. This newly discovered evidence demonstrated that:
(1) Petitioner was convicted on the basis of false and unreliable evidence created by coercive interviews;
(2) the state committed misconduct in the preparation and presentation of this case; and
(3) trial counsel failed to investigate readily available leads that would have undermined the prosecution’s case.
The investigation further revealed recent developments in the area of medical evidence regarding the physical traces of sex abuse, and research by cognitive psychologists which establish the falsity of the expert testimony against Petitioner. These facts had never been presented to any court, and have been discovered and presented as rapidly as reasonably possible to the appropriate Washington state court. See Declaration of Michael Snedeker, attached hereto as Appendix U.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the petition on procedural grounds, as well as on the merits.. In so doing, it committed errors regarding both the appropriate and actual timing of evidence-gathering and presentation in violation of federal and state law (see RAP 13.5(b)(1), and in failing to consider the whole record in its evaluation of the weight of Jennifer Malcom’s recantation. The court also erred in its characterization of what Petitioner should have done, and when she should have done it. See RAP 13.5(b)(2).
By its procedural default of Petitioner’s petition, the Court of Appeals has effectively rewritten the applicable statutes (RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100) to require all Washington prisoners to keep up with a vast body of scientific literature as well as evolving case law, and file their petitions within one year of the appearance of research that undermines material evidence against them, even if it appears in journals to which they have no access, and even if they have no counsel.
The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s contentions that were based on the declarations of Dr. Maggie Bruck and Dr. Steven Gabaeff on grounds that “[n]othing in either of these reports indicates that they could not have been submitted years ago.” Order, p. 5. This statement is factually incorrect. Most of the studies cited by Dr. Bruck in her declaration have been published in this decade. One of the most crucial studies was one that examined the effect of combining various directive interview techniques that had before been studied only in isolation; the study showed that using a combination of improper techniques could generate false charges of touching from children within minutes of the interview’s inception. See Declaration of Dr. Bruck, attached to the petition as Appendix G, p. 24. That study was published in 1997. Ibid.
As Dr. Bruck noted, “in the past decade there has been an exponential increase in research on the accuracy of young children’s memories and the degree to which young children’s memories can be molded by suggestions implanted by adult interviewers.” Declaration of Dr. Bruck, p.3. While there were certain defense advocates who were available to testify on behalf of the accused in the 1980's, there were strongly differing clinical views about whether children could be led to make false statements about having been improperly touched. In 1990, the Washington state court upheld a trial court’s refusal to permit psychological testimony about the effects of suggestive interviewing, in part because it had not been shown that the expert’s position on child interviewing had been accepted by the scientific community. State v. Swan, 114 Wash. 2d 613, 656, 790 P.2d 610 (1990).
Now, however, the views expressed by Dr. Bruck in her declaration are undisputably accepted by the relevant scientific community. She was co-author of a book summarizing the emerging consensus published by the American Psychological Association in 1995. In 1998, that same organization published Investigative Interviews of Children by Debra Poole and Michel Lamb, which makes very clear that a solid consensus based on well-designed research now exists regarding proper and dangerously improper interviewing techniques of children.
Dr. Bruck carefully reviewed the investigative reports filed in this case, and conclusively shows that: (1) the charges presented against Petitioner were generated by exactly the same techniques used to generate other accusations against her that the prosecution itself admitted were false; and that (2) these techniques and circumstances create a significant risk of generating unreliable and false charges of child sex abuse. Her work was triggered by, and strongly supports the recantation of Jennifer Malcom (attached to the petition as Appendix J). It was not challenged by Respondent. In turn, it is corroborated by the undisputed evidence proffered by Dr. Steven Gabaeff that the trial testimony of Dr. Briggite Mengelberg that Jennifer Malcom had been chronically penetrated in both her anus and vagina was false. See Declaration of Dr. Steven Gabaeff, attached to the petition as Appendix K. Medical evidence by itself is sufficient evidence to show that a child has been abused. State v. Swan, supra, 114 Wash. 2d at 640. Dr. Gabaeff’s declaration is based in part on normative studies of children’s anatomy that were published in 1989 and 1991.
Accompanying the emergence of a consensus about the striking effects on children’s reliability produced by insistent and directive adults is a change in the relevant law. It was not until Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), that the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that prior questioning of a young child by adults with a preconceived idea of what had happened could create unreliable evidence, and reversed a conviction because an overly directive interview led to untrustworthy hearsay statements. The first state case to reverse a conviction because of improperly directive interviews of which Petitioner is aware is State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d. 1372 (1994). See also, In re A.E.P. and W.N.P., 135 Wash.2d 208, 227-229 (1998); State v. Carol M.D. and Mark A.D., 89 Wn. App. 77, 89-90, 948 P.2d 837 (1997). Thus, there has also been a significant change in the law since Petitioner filed her initial PRP. See RCP 10.73.100(6).
It is not clear from the Court of Appeals’ Order how Petitioner should have proceeded. Should she have kept up with the evolving medical research, and challenged Dr. Mengelberg’s conclusions on her own in 1992? Should she have then followed with a separate successive petition in the mid 1990's regarding new case law and research by cognitive psychologists regarding the impact of the investigatory techniques employed in this case? Should she then have filed a fourth petition when her daughter reached age 18, left her father’s house, and recanted her testimony against her mother?
Petitioner is not a capital defendant, and has never had any interest in delaying these proceedings. She has moved as speedily as is reasonably possible in investigating the case in light of the new facts presented by Jennifer’s recantation, and filed her petition well within one year of obtaining the declarations of Dr. Bruck and Dr. Gabaeff. Her additional claims regarding prosecutorial misconduct and the ineffective assistance of counsel are nothing like those she previously presented, but present evidence of actual and substantial prejudice that rise directly from the newly discovered evidence presented in this petition.
The Order Dismissing Petitioner’s petition overlooked controlling state law that should have led to a decision on the merits. RCP 10.73.100 provides for a decision on the merits of a collateral attack when “later developments bring into question the validity of petitioner’s continuing detention. Exceptions are made for circumstances which impact directly on the guilt or innocence of the petitioner, such as the discovery of new evidence, RCP 10.73.100(1).” In re Runyan, 121 Wash. 2d 424, 431 (1993). “The statute also leaves open avenues for pursuing collateral relief when subsequent changes in the law could apply retroactively to petitioner’s case, RCP 10.73.100(6), which is a circumstance which could not always be readily be ascertained within one year of final conviction.” Ibid.
Petitioner has utterly undermined the evidentiary basis for her convictions, and shown that she is probably innocent of all charges against her. The Court of Appeals’ refusal to consider any of the evidence proffered by Dr. Bruck and Dr. Gabaeff violates the federal constitution’s guarantee of the right to due process of law (see post), as well as the applicable state law regarding personal restraint petitions. So, too, its refusal to consider the issues of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel and governmental misconduct, despite the wealth of specific and detailed new evidence, including evidence that could not have been previously presented, violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights. (See post)
The Court of Appeal found Jennifer Malcom’s recantation untimely as well as insufficient to warrant the reversal of any of Petitioner’s convictions. Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the declarations of Dr. Bruck and Dr. Gabaeff were not “newly discovered,” it did not, and could not, contend that they were untimely. Both were filed with the court within months of their preparation. They are an essential part of Petitioner’s petition, no less important than the recantation of Jennifer. And the affidavit signed by Jennifer was signed in February of 1998, and contained matter regarding how she was interrogated by Sharon Krause that had not been deemed important until the work of Dr. Bruck had been concluded in the summer of 1997. The Court of Appeals violated settled state law as well as the federal constitution’s guarantee of due process of law by denying Petitioner a decision on the merits because the petition was “untimely.”
The Court of Appeals considered the weight of Jennifer’s recantation without considering in any way the detailed and extensive evidence proffered by Dr. Bruck and Dr. Gabaeff, or the undisputed argument by Petitioner showing the clear errors of Dr. McGovern’s testimony. Appendix *, pp. 5-6. It states that Kirk’s testimony “corroborated” the evidence of Petitioner having abused “Chuck”, “Mark”, and “James”, but overlooks the fact that there is no such evidence at all other than Kirk’s own uncorroborated testimony.
The only part of the prosecution’s case that remains is the testimony of Kirk Malcom. It is squarely contradicted by Jennifer, because according to Kirk, she was present on every occasion that the children were molested. Kirk, however, had strenuously denied any such molestation until he was about to be sentenced himself, and until his father urged him to testify against Petitioner, because to do so would “help” her, as well as himself. See petition, p. 12, fn. 6. His testimony now has no independent corroboration. Appendix A, pp. 5-6. Nothing remains to the prosecution but the uncorroborated and suspect statements of Kirk.
In its discussion of the weight of Jennifer’s recantation, The Court of Appeal inexplicably stated that it was rejecting the recantation in its entirety because it “does not clearly entitle Malcom to a new trial on most counts.” p. 5. Why not a new trial on those counts which it did undermine? Since when is a court’s belief that there is sufficient reliable and unchallenged evidence to support most counts grounds for affirming all counts?
State law as well as federal law provide that a recantation, like other newly discovered evidence, must be evaluated in the context of the whole record, including other evidence of the crime, if any, and in light of the circumstances surrounding the recantation. See State v. Smith, 80 Wn.App.462, 472, 909 P.2d 1335 (1996), reversed on other grounds, 131 Wash. 2d 258,930 P.2d 917; State v. Macon, 128 Wash. 2d 784, 798, 800-802 911 P.2d 1004 (1996 ); State v. Rolax, 84 Wash. 2d 836, 838, 529 P.2d 1078 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Wright v. Morris, 85 Wash.2d 899, 540 P.2d 893 (1975); State v. Eder, 78 Wash. App. 352, 358-361, 899 P.2d 810 (1995). The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the weight Jennifer Malcom’s recantation in light of the other material and relevant evidence before it. The court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition was a
V.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
A. Prejudicially Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner was convicted in violation of her right to due process of law, to present a defense, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against her, to a fair trial, and to effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth, and Fifth, Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, by governmental misconduct, in that both the prosecutor and the chief investigative officer supplied materially deceptive information to experts who testified against Petitioner, and presented false reports to counsel and false testimony to the jury regarding how the investigation against Petitioner was conducted.
Facts in support of this contention include the following:
1. Petitioner hereby incorporates all facts, arguments, and authorities set out elsewhere in this petition.
2. Sharon Krause’s failure to provide Dr. Mengelberg with medical reports showing that other alleged victims showed no traces of having been abused, combined with her false representations to Dr. Mengelberg that the children had indeed been abused, and that Jennifer Malcom had been abused “for six years,” was a successful effort to misinform Dr. Mengelberg and improperly bias her towards findings which are now known to have been false.
3. The provision by the prosecutor of damning information he had previously stated that he knew to be false regarding Petitioner’s led directly to an unfavorable psychological report that adversely influenced the length of Petitioner’s sentence.
4. There are significant deviations between the witness encounters described in the state’s chronology of witness contacts and the utility reports provided to Petitioner, and inaccuracies in the reports themselves. These reports show that it is highly probable that Detective Krause attributed to the children words that were actually her own, both in her written reports and in her trial testimony.
5. The provision of false and misleading information to Petitioner’s counsel and to the court by the prosecutor and the chief investigative officer had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdicts in this case, and rendered Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair.
C. The Case Investigators Employed Improperly Coercive and Directive Investigative Techniques Highly Likely to Generate False and Unreliable Accusations
Petitioner was
convicted in violation of her right to due process of law, to present a
defense, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and to effective
assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth, and [3]
The Binford family testified in support of Petitioner at trial. See
[5] A chronology of investigative materials, and the materials themselves, is attached hereto as Appendix F.
[6] This
[7] Kirk’s testimony describing
his first accusation against his mother is as follows: “Question: Now you
told the jury, when Mr. Bennett [defense counsel] was questioning you, that you
talked to Sharon for about an hour and denied anything; and then talked to your
dad, and then talked to Sharon again. Is that the way it happened?” Answer:
“Yes, that’s correct.” Question: “What did you and your dad talk about?”
Answer: “Well, he said – he told me that it would get her help if, you know,
these things – if something was happening; it would help me so I could get out
of that situation. And then I thought about it for a while. And then I go
‘Okay, that sounds like a good idea.’ And then I went to the bathroom and came
back and talked to
[8] “Question: Okay. And why
would you go up and down? Answer: Just – I don’t know really – just that’s the
way you have sex. Question: How do you know that? Answer: Because when I
was in the seventh grade they taught us about it.”
[11] Of the seven questions related to the charges at bench, Petitioner’s denials were assessed as truthful. See Declaration of Marilynn Malcom, Appendix S.
[12] This Court noted that
counsel stipulated to the entry of the psychological exam, and said: “[t]he
failure to object to the admission of evidence in the sentencing hearing waives
the objection.” Division II, Unpublished Opinion,
[13] Ceci & Bruck, Jeopardy in the Courtroom, American Psychological Association (Washington, D.C.: 1995)
[14] Although researchers have never been able to identify common reactions that children have to sexual abuse, experts were quite willing to testify that a child had been sexually abused based on specific symptoms in the 1980s. The behavioral grounds of child complainants offered by experts for how they arrived at their diagnoses varied widely, and occasionally were just the opposite of what other experts relied on. See, e.g., State v.Maule (Wash. 1983) 667 P.2d 96 (sleep disruption, loss of appetite, withdrawal, regression, fear of being alone with a particular person, clinging to mother); State v. Myers (Minn. 1984) 359 N.W.2d 604, 608-609 (poor mother-daughter relationship, fear of men, unusual sexual knowledge, looking and acting older); State v. Kim (Hawaii 1982) 645 P.2d 1330, 1333 (fear for safety, depression, anxiety, negative view of sex).
[15] See Nathan, D. & Snedeker, M. Satan's Silence: Ritual Abuse and the Making of a Modern American Witch Hunt (Basicbooks, 1995)See Nathan, D. & Snedeker, M. Satan’s Silence: Ritual Abuse and the Making of a Modern American Witch Hunt (Basicbooks, 1995) (analyzing the origins and rapid growth of false charges of ritual sex abuse during the 1980s).